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Abstract 
Cultural Criminology (CC) is one of the most recent and exciting developments in 
criminological theory. Its main argument is that mainstream criminological theories 
provide inadequate explanations of crime due to epistemological and theoretical flaws. 
CC´s alternative involves assuming a phenomenological and interpretative approach 
that focuses on the cultural and emotional components of crime. In this article I shall 
argue that although CC makes a valid demand for more realistic and complex 
explanations of crime, its own alternative needs to deal with two main challenges 
referred to its conceptualization of explanation and emotion. First, two problematic 
antagonisms should be avoided: understanding vs. causal explanation; and universal 
nomothetic explanations as opposed to ideographic descriptions. Considering recent 
developments in philosophy of social science, particularly the ‘social mechanisms 
approach’, CC should focus on explaining retrospectively through identification of 
specific causal mechanisms rejecting universal and predictive pretensions. Second, 
although cultural criminologists rightly question the emotionless character of 
criminological explanations, they lack an articulated alternative conceptualization of 
emotions to explain crime. A more refined concept needs to be elaborated in dialogue 
with recent advances in social sciences.   
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I. Introduction  
Cultural Criminology (CC) is one of the most exciting recent 
developments in criminological theory (Carlen, 2011). Inspired by a range of 
sources (phenomenology, symbolic interactionism, sub-cultural theory, labelling 
approach, moral panic theory, neo-Marxist critical theory), the attraction resides 
in its ambitious goal, that of providing an explanation of crime which 
emphasizes cultural and emotional dimensions. Emotions are a neglected topic 
in criminology (De Haan & Loader, 2002; see also Sherman, 2003; Karstedt, 
2011) and particularly in the explanation of crime. However, CC involves more 
than including emotions in the explanation of crime and constitutes an 
epistemological and theoretical challenge to orthodox criminology synthesized 
in two ‘nemeses’; scientific positivism and rational choice (Ferrell et al., 2015).1  
On a theoretical level, CC questions a central assumption of most 
mainstream criminological theories. Crime is a mundane, routinized and 
instrumental activity. Criminals are depicted as either rational individuals who 
maximize opportunities (Clarke & Cornish, 1985), or as individuals driven to 
crime owing to deficits in psychological and social controls (Gottfredson & 
Hirschi, 1990; Felson & Boba, 2010). Both alternatives assume an individual 
lacking moral interpretation of crimes. Therefore, explanations of crime are 
theoretically weak, involving a poor account of deviant motivations (Fenwick & 
Hayward, 2000; Young, 2004, Hayward, 2016). CC provides a theoretical 
alternative based on three components. First, crime is considered ‘seldom 
 
1 Although CC is not a unified paradigm, cultural criminologists share an important number of theoretical 
and methodological orientations (Ferrell et al., 2015; Hayward, 2016). The idea of CC as more than a 
loose collection of criminologists is implicitly present in discussions in the literature where both cultural 
criminologists and their critics refer to CC, assuming that there is much internal commonality. Although 
my focus will be a discussion of CC´s basic shared assumptions and claims, whenever necessary I shall 
distinguish arguments among different cultural criminologists.  
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mundane, frequently not miserable – but always meaningful’ (Ferrell et al., 
2015: 67). It should be understood as creative behaviour expressing issues of 
identity, lifestyle and resistance embedded in particular subcultures (Hayward & 
Young, 2012). Deviant subjects´ attempts to make sense involve a political 
‘rebellion’, a capacity to resist meanings assigned by dominant power groups 
(Ferrell, 2007; Presdee, 2000). Therefore, culture should play a decisive role in 
the explanation of crime. Second, CC assumes Katz’s project of opening the 
explanatory black box between traditional background factors and crime by 
exploring the emotional foreground (Hayward, 2002; Katz, 1988). Without a 
phenomenology of transgression focused on emotions, it is impossible to make 
sense of many crimes and border behaviours such as joyriding, football 
hooliganism, binge drinking, etc. (Hayward, 2007). Third, cultural and emotional 
understanding of deviance should include the conditions of late modernity and 
the structural and institutional conditions of inequality and power relations 
dismissed by Katz (Hayward & Young, 2004; Young, 2003; Ferrell & Hayward, 
2014).  
On an epistemological level, CC and its ‘intellectual lawlessness’ is 
assumed as ‘an anathema to the project of criminology as a science of crime’ 
(Hayward & Young, 2004: 269).2 Three elements are in question. First, 
universal and abstract explanations insensitive to the diversity of criminal 
experience should be replaced by a more specific, phenomenological and 
interpretative approach capable of apprehending the cultural dimension of crime 
 
2 Some critics have pointed out the existence of epistemological disagreements among cultural 
criminologists particularly regarding the idealism – realism debate (Matthews, 2014; O’Brien, 2005). 
However, this disagreement might be less strong than is generally assumed by critics. CC has strongly 
rejected this reversion to left idealism and the ‘romanticization’ of the offender even by authors such as 
Jeff Farrell, who are assumed as be closer to idealism (see Ferrell, 2007; Ferrell et al. 2015). Additionally, 
the existence of this type of disagreements is not an obstacle for sharing a view regarding causality, 
prediction and the scientific enterprise.   
4 
 
and crime control (Hayward, 2004; Young, 2011; Currie, 2014). Second, CC 
opposes prediction and causality based on the correlation of objective/material 
factors that ignore diverse individual responses based on their interpretation of 
the situation (Ferrell et al., 2015; Young, 2004). A different notion of explanation 
as understanding is required. Based on Geertz’s (1983) interpretative notion of 
social science, and on the naturalistic tradition in criminology, CC assumes the 
idea of ‘criminological verstehen’, which enables an empathic interpretation of 
subject´s situation, motivations and actions (Ferrell, 1999). Third, CC criticizes 
the mainstream obsession with quantitative methods based on statistical 
testing, considering them an ‘intellectual prison’ which wipes out creativity 
(Ferrell, 2004; Morrison, 2004). The most adequate methods are the 
combination of ethnography and media and textual analysis through the 
accumulation of in-depth case studies as opposed to quantitative 
methodologies (Ferrell, 1999; Ferrell & Sanders, 1995; Young, 2011). In 
particular, ethnography enables a horizontal and negotiated relationship 
between the researcher and the subject of research (Ferrell, 2009). 
Ethnography blurs the distance between the researcher and the setting (Ferrell 
2004) and is better suited to the volatile character of deviance (Presdee, 2004).  
In other words, ‘sociology of correlation’ should be substituted by ‘sociology of 
skin’ (Hayward & Young, 2004: 268).3 
CC has received a mixed response. Some critics have welcomed its 
revitalization of criminological theory and its provision of a more complex 
understanding of crime (Coyle, 2009; Downes, 2005; Maruna, 2008; Matthews, 
2014; Mclaughlin, 2008). Other authors find it difficult to identify what is new in 
 
3 Although CC was originally developed in US and UK, in the last decade it has expanded outside the 
Anglo-Saxon context in Europe (see Schuilenburg et al., 2018 for the Dutch case) and even in Latin 
America (see Rocha 2013 for the Brazil case). 
5 
 
CC and label it as merely ‘reinventing the wheel’ (Carlen, 2008; Farrell, 2010; 
Hallsworth, 2006; Tanner-Smith, 2004). Finally, some have questioned CC as 
an explanatory alternative due to its theoretical insufficiencies and 
epistemological contradictions (Hall & Winlow, 2007; O´Brien, 2005; Webber, 
2007).  
CC makes a valid demand for more realistic and complex explanations of 
crime. Yet its excessive emphasis on antagonizing a ‘fuzzy’ opponent, 
mainstream criminology, and its ‘evangelizing’ about what should be done 
rather than doing it (Carlen, 2008) has obstructed the development of an 
articulate alternative explanatory framework. I shall argue that although CC is 
not merely ‘old wine in new bottles’, it needs to deal more adequately with some 
epistemological and theoretical challenges. The analysis will focus on 
discussing two key components: explanation and emotions. 
Although CC clearly opposes the idea of causality associated with a 
behaviourist natural science model that dismisses culture, it remains ambivalent 
about its own alternative. Critics have questioned this ambiguity and called for a 
distinction between two epistemological options; either assign culture a key role 
and resign explanatory goals under an interpretative approach, or retain 
explanatory pretentions under a causal law like universal model (O´Brien, 
2005). I will argue that this criticism and CC´s weak responses assume two 
problematic antagonisms; interpretation as opposed to causal explanation, and 
universal nomothetic explanations as opposed to ideographic descriptions. I will 
explore how the ‘Social mechanisms approach’ provides with an intermediate 
alternative focused on explaining retrospectively through identifying specific 
causal mechanisms, and rejecting universal and predictive pretensions. This 
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approach provides culture with a relevant explanatory role and makes sense of 
multiple causal connections present in CC analysis. However, the identification 
of specific causal mechanisms demands precise explanatory categories. 
Therefore, CC´s key explanatory concept, emotion, needs to be analyzed. 
One crucial component in CC is the inclusion of emotions. CC questions 
the incapacity of criminological theories to explain irrational crime and deviance. 
The central idea defended by Hayward, Ferrell, Young among others, is that 
individuals get involved in crime because it enables them to experience 
emotions. Crime offers an exciting liberation from a mundane reality and the 
opportunity to obtain sense and transcendence. However, CC lacks an 
alternative conceptualization of emotions. I will discuss what are the different 
ideas associated with emotions by CC. Next, I will discuss CC´s emphasis on 
the emotions´ meaningful and intentional character and its problematic 
functionality. I will also analyse CC’s vague use of specific emotions. Finally, I 
will analyze two possibilities of causal connection with criminal behaviour 
dismissed by CC: as deterrents and as motivational antecedents.  
 
II. Explanation, understanding and causal mechanisms 
in CC  
Social scientists face two challenges. First, how can the dualism between 
social determinism and freedom be resolved? Should social theories focus on 
objective macro level entities, or should the emphasis be placed on the micro 
level, giving agency a central role? (Giddens, 1984; Hollis, 1994). Second, what 
type of epistemological model should social science assume? Should social 
scientists emulate the natural sciences and identify general law – like causal 
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explanations? Or is the nature of social affairs so different that it requires an 
ideographic – interpretative approach focussing on exploring the contextualized 
meaning of human practices? (Rosenberg, 2015). 
CC claims to overcome the structure/agent dualism in criminology 
(Ferrell, 2007) by assuming an interpretative approach and rejecting a natural 
science model (Hayward & Young, 2004). However, CC´s theoretical solution 
has been questioned due to its confusing use of ideographic and nomothetic 
approaches. CC develops ideographic thick descriptions (apropos Geertz´s 
perspective) to support nomothetic general statements (apropos Marvin Harris’s 
perspective), ignoring its methodological, theoretical and epistemological 
contradictions (O´Brien, 2005; Webber, 2007). This criticism revives the social 
sciences´ challenge between ideographic and nomothetic approaches. On the 
one hand, nomothetic approaches assume the natural sciences model, 
envisaging abstract universal laws in which particular cases can be subsumed, 
and causality plays a key role in achieving explanation and prediction of social 
phenomena (Machlup, 1994; Risjord, 2014; Rosenberg, 2015). O´Brien shows 
how this approach in anthropology, notably Harris´s cultural materialism, looks 
forward to examine the cultural ‘contents’ (values, rituals, etc.) of community 
members in order to obtain cultural ‘forms’, that is, ‘general laws of cultural 
development’. Culture is conceptualized as a finite, patterned and specific 
response to external and material conditions (O’Brien, 2005). On the other 
hand, ideographic approaches oppose natural science models, consider 
general social laws as either impossible or inadequate, reject prediction and 
causal explanation as valid goals, and seek detailed descriptions of social 
reality in order to understand human practices (Taylor, 1967; Little, 1991). In 
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anthropology Geertz’s dense descriptions are a paradigmatic example in which 
‘cultural forms’ are not the final goal, but a means of understanding its ‘cultural 
contents’ (O’Brien, 2005).  
Due to an incorrect use of the anthropological tradition, it is argued that 
CC shows contradictions on three levels. First, while it criticizes mainstream 
criminological explanations for assuming a natural science approach, CC 
exhibits similar levels of abstraction and generality (Fenwick, 2004). Second, 
CC questionably uses an ideographic approach to obtain these general 
conclusions (O´Brien, 2005). Finally, CC involves theoretical contradictions, 
stating simultaneously that i) agents are deliberate and creative and their 
cultural practices produce the structure, and that ii) structural constraints 
determine agents and their cultural interactions. ‘Human culture cannot be 
simultaneously ﬁnite and inﬁnite, fundamentally free and fundamentally 
constrained, programmed and willed’ (O’Brien, 2005:607). According to O’Brien, 
CC has to choose either Geertz’s tradition and produce rich criminological 
descriptions of subcultures, assuming that individuals play the decisive role, 
refusing explanatory/predictive goals; or assume Harris’s tradition and develop 
general nomothetic causal laws with explanatory and predictive power over 
crime, assuming that individuals play a weak role, and reducing culture to a 
dependent variable shaped by material circumstances. 
Although O’Brien correctly identifies an imprecise and contradictory use 
of the concept of culture in CC, his conclusions are incorrect due to two 
connected problematic antagonisms that both O´Brien and CC assume: 
i. Either the social sciences includes human intentions/motivations and 
makes its goal understanding and making sense of social behaviour, or it 
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assumes as a goal causally explaining social behaviour but needs to 
exclude human intentions/motivations. 
ii. Either the social sciences explains and predicts social phenomena 
through general law-like statements, or it abandons explanation and 
prediction and produces detailed and idiosyncratic 
narratives/descriptions of social phenomena. 
In relation to the first problem, causal explanation and interpretative 
understanding tend to be seen as antagonistic. In Von Wright´s terms: 
‘Explanation involves identifying general causes of an event, whereas 
understanding involves discovering the meaning of an event or practice in a 
particular context’ (1971:5). Similarly, Geertz´s notion of understanding as ‘thick 
description’ where a deeper knowledge of individuals’ purposes, values, and 
practices enables making sense of their actions or making them intelligible 
(Geertz, 1983).  Therefore: ‘interpretation is the beginning and the end and 
causal analysis is out of place in social inquiry’ (Little, 1991:74). CC follows this 
approach and rejects causal explanation as deterministic, behaviourist, 
empiricist, lacking validity, and proposes understanding as an alternative 
(Ferrell et al., 2015; Young, 2004; 2011). However, although CC rejects terms 
such as ‘cause’ or ‘causal’, it employs terms such as ‘explanation’ or 
‘explanatory’ without clarifying its meaning or how are they connected with the 
interpretative approach in a non-causal way. CC´s opposition to causality is 
more rhetorical than real and is based on an unnecessary antagonism between 
understanding and causal explanation. Geertz’s approach is inspired by a 
Weberian perspective that integrates understanding and causal explanation. 
Sociology´s goal is to understand social action in order to causally explain its 
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development and effects (Weber, 1951). Davidson claims that mental states are 
not only ‘reasons’ for action but also ‘causes’ of action. If an individual has a 
reason for acting in X way, that reason for acting can be understood as a cause 
for his acting in X way (Davidson, 1963). It is problematic to see criminology as 
having to choose between either understanding or explaining causally, as ‘to 
interpret is to explain’ or in other words ‘interpreting an action is to explain it in 
terms of its antecedent motivational states’ (Elster, 2015:52), and using causal 
language does not require paying the price of determinism or ignoring actors’ 
purposes.  
CC´s approach implicitly includes the notion of causality through 
background factors and structural conditions that operate throughout actors´ 
motivational states to produce crime. There are examples of causal statements 
in CC at different levels of analysis. A micro level example is the idea that 
individuals do graffiti writing because it enables them to experience powerful 
visceral sensations such as pride, pleasure and recognition (Hasley & Young, 
2006). Involvement and continuity of those practices is causally produced by 
these specific emotional states. At the meso level an example is the idea that 
institutional policies unexpectedly stimulate transgression (Morrison, 1995; 
Presdee, 2000). Two causal connections are present: i) authorities under a 
mistaken belief (youths are deterred by the increasing probability of arrest) 
apply policies oriented to dissuade potential offenders; ii) youths motivated by 
the desire to challenge authority perceive these policies and feel encouraged to 
defy them, and therefore, commit crimes. Making explicit the causal statements 
in CC does not imply ignoring the macro level or the role played by institutions 
in the construction of criminality. Ferrell´s (1995) research on graffiti shows how: 
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i) urban changes under late capitalism involve the rising privatization of public 
spaces and help to generate ii) a perception of graffiti writers as an ‘aesthetic 
threat to cities’ economic vitality’, and therefore, provokes iii) that authorities’ 
implement different policies (e.g. high tech surveillance systems) and ‘cultural 
wars’ to criminalize graffiti writers as violent vandals and remove them from the 
public space, which in turn, aggravates the problem, producing; iv)  a more 
organized and politicized resistance by these groups.  
These examples show that the idea of explanation as the search of 
causal antecedents is present in CC. Basically, some type of event (crime, 
transgression, or its criminalization) is being explained and other types of 
events or entities at different levels of analysis are used as causal antecedents 
to explain them. The difference is that, rather than focusing exclusively on 
objective and material antecedents, CC gives a central role to motivational and 
mental states unlike other criminological alternatives. According to cultural 
criminologists statistical analysis and control theories ignore motivations, either 
by correlating background risk factors with no subjective content in the first case 
(Young, 2003), or by assuming that crime is unmotivated and is the result of 
deficits of inner or external controls in the second case (Ferrell et al., 2015). In 
rational choice theories, motivation is included but in a very simplistic way. 
Offenders are depicted as ‘pallid creatures calculating the best manoeuvres in 
order to minimize risk and maximize contentment’ (Young, 2003:391).  
However, if CC can be expressed in terms of causal connections and 
culture is used through motivational states as a causal antecedent, does this 
mean that CC has to assume a more abstract law-like approach following 
Harris’s model? Or should it give up any explanatory pretentions and return to 
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Geertz´s deep descriptions? This second antagonism can be framed in more 
general terms: ‘Are there law like generalizations in the social sciences? If not, 
are we thrown back on mere description and narrative? In my opinion, the 
answer to both questions is no’ (Elster, 1989:32). There is an intermediate 
alternative that has been defended by analytical sociologists and some 
philosophers of social science which centres explanations on the identification 
of ‘social mechanisms’ (Elster, 2015; Hedström, 2005; Hedström & Bearman, 
2009; Hedström & Ylikoski, 2011; Mahoney, 2001; in criminology see Sampson, 
2011). This approach allows reframing CC as a more precise explanatory option 
in relation to inadequate contemporary alternatives and simultaneously avoids 
O´Brien’s two unattractive possibilities. Three characteristics are relevant in this 
approach directly connected with CC´s goals.  
 
Reductionist strategy 
There is a ‘reductionist strategy’ which ‘narrow[s] the gap between cause 
and effect’ and which opposes to covering law explanations and statistical 
explanations (Hedström & Swedberg, 1998:25). The goal is to make explicit the 
internal workings underlying the explanatory ‘black boxes’ (Elster, 1989; 
Boudon, 1998; Hedström & Bearman, 2009).  Explanation requires a conceptual 
account of how change in some variable is brought about which involves 
exploring what goes on inside specific social processes (Sorensen, 1998). 
Opening ‘black boxes’, however, is not merely finding unknown intermediate 
variables between explanans and explanandum. To avoid a correlational 
perspective, we must seek theoretical ‘unobservable causal processes’ which 
link observable events, variables and outcomes (Mahoney, 2001; Goertz & 
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Mahoney, 2012). For example, Young (2007) challenges a simple causal 
connection between poverty/inequality and crime by providing four additional 
intermediate causal mechanisms: individuals share cultural values/goals; they 
perceive as unfair their situation of relative deprivation; they feel humiliated and 
angry; and they perceive crime as a way of challenging this state of affairs. 
Adequate explanations can be articulated when we open this invisible 
subcultural and emotional ‘black box’ unexplored by explanations focused on 
objective background variables. 
 
Specificity and indeterminacy 
Social mechanisms approach provides explanations characterized by 
greater specificity and indeterminacy. Social mechanisms explanations are 
more specific than abstract laws but ‘more general than the social phenomena 
that they subsume’ (Elster, 1998:49). For Elster, detailed knowledge of the 
causal connections improves explanations that minimize the risk of 
spuriousness but also weakens predictive possibilities. Social complexity 
generates causal indeterminacy in two senses. Sometimes, indeterminacy is 
related to the unknown conditions under which a causal mechanism will be 
triggered. On other occasions, it is possible to foresee that diverse causal 
mechanisms will influence a variable in conflicting directions but with an 
indeterminate net effect. Although we are unable to predict what the output will 
be we can explain it retrospectively (Elster, 1989). Similarly, CC has criticized 
criminological theories which resemble little the specific and real experiences of 
offenders (Hayward & Young, 2004). Additionally, Young has questioned 
prediction as a failed criminological project unable to anticipate the increase of 
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crime from the 1960s to the 1990s and the decrease of crime since the 1990s. 
Predicting crime based on the correlation of objective factors overlooks that 
individuals and their interpretations might change independently of those 
factors. And prediction has become even more illusory under the volatile 
context of late modernity (Young, 2004; 2011).  
The idea of undetermined social mechanisms helps to defend CC’s 
explanatory value despite its inability to predict. Additionally, CC´s explanatory 
claims have a lower level of abstraction and are less vulnerable to criticisms 
about its similarity to general statements employed by mainstream criminology 
(Fenwick, 2004), as well as its necessity for assuming law like nomothetic 
explanations (O´Brien, 2005). For example, the key causal connection between 
committing crimes in order to defy authority and experiencing emotions (Ferrell, 
1995; Presdee, 2000) can be interpreted as a complex and undetermined 
combination of causal mechanisms. An individual who has been arrested might 
suffer stigmatization and humiliation. Yet, his reaction depends, as these 
emotions might result in additional emotional mechanisms. Perhaps, if they 
produce a predominant combination of guilt and fear, the agent feels dissuaded 
and avoids being involved in deviance again. However, if anger and resentment 
are prevalent, maybe his future deviation might be reinforced. But if excitement 
of defying authority predominates over negative feelings, an increasing 
deviance might occur in the future. We cannot predict offender’s reaction 
because we do not know which of the three mechanisms will be triggered or 
whether the three will operate simultaneously. But once we know the outcome, 
we can explain retrospectively what occurred.  
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Against deterministic explanations 
There is an antagonism towards deterministic explanations which dismiss 
individuals and intentional components. Actions need to be analyzed as 
‘meaningful’ or ‘grounded on reasons’ (Boudon 1998:175). As Hedström puts it: 
‘I would like to reserve the word cause for a less causal notion of causality’ 
(Hedström, 2005:23). Yet, strong emphasis on micro foundations or the micro 
level of actor´s motivations, do not preclude including the meso and macro 
levels (Hedström & Bearman, 2009; Ylikoski forthcoming).  This analytical 
approach focused on identification of causal mechanisms is not necessarily 
committed with methodological individualism. For example, Hedström and 
Udehn (2009) argue for ‘structural individualism’ which attributes ‘substantial 
explanatory importance to social structures in which individuals are embedded’ 
(2009:4). Daniel Little’s ‘methodological localism’ also provides a key role to the 
meso level constituted by institutions and organizations: ‘The molecule of all 
social life is the socially constructed and socially situated individual, who lives, 
acts, and develops within a set of local social relationships, institutions, norms, 
and rules’ (2011:280). 
This claim complements CC’s goal of overcoming structure–agent 
dilemma by focusing explanation on the subject’s cultural motivations in the 
context of macro structural and material conditions (Hayward & Young, 2004). 
This claim also goes in line with recent developments that combine CC and Left 
Realism (aka, ‘Cultural Realism’) that defend the use of critical realism and the 
identification of contingent and generative causal mechanisms underlying social 
processes and structures (Matthews, 2014a; 2014b).  However, it also demands 
a specification of the social mechanisms involved between micro and macro 
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levels which involves including the institutional level. In CC’s explanations 
institutional components are scarce and, if mentioned, they are generally 
depicted as homogenous and simple contextual conditions or reactions to 
transgressions (O´Brien, 2005). For example, the criminal justice system, the 
media or the labour market are incorporated in Young´s (2007) merely in their 
basic function of social exclusion and cultural inclusion. In Ferrell´s (1996) 
explanation, again, public institutions appear as an homogenous reaction that 
criminalizes and exacerbates graffiti writing.  
To sum up, it is incorrect to argue that explaining crime using culture 
demands i) assuming a nomothetic model and ii) reducing culture to a 
materialistic output.4 An alternative solution involves challenging the opposition 
understanding vs. explanation, assuming that CC involves explanation through 
motivational antecedent states, and reframing its causal statements in terms of 
a social mechanisms approach. This intermediate explanatory perspective 
between universal laws and idiosyncratic narratives emphasizes the contingent, 
specific, and retrospective nature of explanations centred on the exploration of 
motivational states in interaction with the institutional and structural levels.  Yet, 
reframing CC in terms of a social mechanism approach demands precision in 
the categories used to explain crime. Consequently, it is relevant to analyze a 
key explanatory concept in CC: emotions. 
 
III. Emotions in Cultural Criminology  
 
4 An unexplored issue in this study is the conceptualization of culture.  Despite culture has a key role in 
CC, its excessive amplitude and heterogeneity of meanings weakens its value for the explanation of 
crime. Additionally, its problematic conceptualization involves risks of tautology and axiomatic 
definitions which make difficult its empirical assessment (see Trajtenberg, 2011). 
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CC has questioned conventional criminology´s ‘desiccated’ perspective 
in which crime is considered mundane and lacking any emotional content 
(Ferrell et al., 2015, Hayward, 2016). Sociological positivism ‘translates 
background factors of deprivation into a simple foreground narrative of 
experienced deficit with crime as the relief of such deprivation’ (Hayward & 
Young, 2004:267). Rational choice theory opposes emotions by assuming the 
criminal´s rational maximization of available opportunities as the unique 
narrative (Hayward, 2007; 2012). None of these accounts understands the: 
‘internal psychic – emotive processes’ taking place in crime (Ferrell et al., 
2015). They are inappropriate to explain ‘the crimes of the irrational actor’ 
(Hayward, 2004), that is, chaotic and expressive offences such as gang 
violence, child molestation, drunken vandalism, etc. (Hayward, 2007).  
Cultural criminologists’ analysis of the emotional component of deviance 
has been mainly influenced by Matza and Sykes’s work on youths’ subculture of 
crime (see Ferrell et al., 2015; Presdee, 2000). Particularly, key questions are: 
why youths find attractive deviance? Why youths take ‘moral holidays’ and drift 
into delinquency? (Sykes & Matza, 1957).  The motivating force for breaking the 
law lies in the emotional stimulation. Unlike mundane and routine conventional 
life (‘only suckers work’), crime provides youths with a life style characterized by 
excitement, adventure, danger, physical dangers and thrills. In fact, youths 
purposely ‘produce’ excitement by defying authorities and legal order (Matza & 
Sykes, 1961).5 
More recently, Katz has exerted a decisive influence on the 
phenomenology of emotions in CC. He localizes motivations for crime in the 
 
5 However, it is wrong to assume a gap between deviant and conventional values. Many of these attitudes, 
even those associated with violence and aggression, permeate societies’ conventional culture (Matza & 
Sykes, 1961; see also Presdee 2000). 
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foreground of ‘immediate lived experience’ in opposition to distant background 
forces. For example, in order to know why the ‘righteous slaughter’ commits 
homicide is key to explore the emotional dynamics of the situation. When 
individuals find that moral principles are violated, they feel humiliated and angry, 
and in order to recuperate their self-respect they carry out a vengeful slaughter. 
Without this emotional component, criminology is unable to explain why 
individuals with similar characteristics differ in their criminality (Katz, 1988). 
Crime constitutes a way of transcending humiliation and the triviality of 
everyday life, providing a sensual and liberating experience. CC contextualizes 
Katz´s analysis in the conditions of late modernity exploring its direct role on 
individual´s motivation, and its indirect influence through the state and the 
market (Brotherton, 2014; Ferrell et al., 2015; Young 2007).  
In relation to the motivation to transgress, cultural criminologists agree 
with Matza and Sykes on emotion´s general role in crime. According to 
Hayward, individuals face a paradoxical situation in late modernity. Feelings of 
ontological insecurity owing to structural uncertainty are combined with being 
hyper-controlled by diverse state and non-state agencies. Crime and risky 
activities represent a way of breaking with everyday life and escape from an 
insecure but over-controlled world. Crime provides the excitement of breaching 
the rules which enables individuals to exercise control of their destiny and to 
express identity (Hayward, 2011). Similarly, for Lyng individuals engage 
voluntarily in extreme activities, where the threat of death or injury is permanent 
and they push themselves to the edge looking forward to experiment 
‘adrenaline rush’ in order to achieve self-determination. By risking their lives, 
individuals seek to recover choice and to escape from society´s alienation 
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(Lyng, 2004). For Hayward and Young individuals ‘lose control to take control’ 
(2004:268). According to Ferrell, actual societies are characterized by an 
‘unbearable boredom’, producing situations of existential breakdown and strain 
between expectations and goals. Non-legal activities are ‘antidotes’ to deal with 
this structural boredom (Ferrell, 2004). Illegal graffiti involves feelings of 
adrenaline rush and constitutes a means of self-expression and resistance to 
authority. It is an anarchist response that resists assuming negative emotions 
imposed by agents of social control (Ferrell, 1995). Presdee also observes that 
crime explains how individuals go ‘from being bored to being excited [...] from 
being powerless to being powerful’ (2004:280). Transgression is a ‘therapeutic 
action’ that relieves the pain of being ‘excluded’. In lives characterized by 
boredom and lack of meaning breaking the limits allow individuals to acquire 
feelings (2004:281). Young depicts how ‘bulimic societies’ which culturally 
includes but structurally excludes, generates for the excluded intense emotions 
of disrespect, loss of identity and anger. Breaking the norms involves more than 
utilitarian behaviours. Deviance is ‘delightful’ and ‘exciting’ as it provides ways 
of dealing with humiliation and helps to reassert dignity and identity (Young, 
2007).  
In relation to the role played by institutions in the connection between 
emotions and crime, the exciting activities which revolutionize everyday life are 
increasingly labelled and considered illegal by state authorities (Ferrell, 2004). 
However, institutional efforts to control crime have an unexpected effect. Many 
of the ‘rational’ state efforts to impose order ignore real sensual motivations and 
paradoxically exacerbate the same transgressions they intend to eliminate. 
Transgressors are given what they demand: challenges and thrills (Morrison, 
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1995; Presdee, 2000). Some situational crime prevention policies increase the 
attraction of offences by generating new risks and intensifying older ones 
(Morrison, 1995; Hayward, 2007). The market generates a permanent and 
insatiable hedonistic desire to consume associated with frustration that may be 
assuaged through crime. At the same time, market forces commodify and 
transform transgressions in ‘cool, fashionable, and desirable consumer choices’ 
(Hayward, 2002). Ironically, the subversive meaning of borderline behaviours 
might be stimulated by state responses and yet weakened, trivialized and 
assimilated by processes of market commodification (Ferrell, 2007).  
It is difficult to find in CC’s papers any theoretical account focused on the 
nature of emotions and their connection with action, except from a short section 
in Ferrell, et al. (2015:64–74).6 Based on developments in the sociology of 
emotions, it is argued that emotions involve three dimensions: i) 
corporeal/physical; ii) affective; iiii) and a cognitive dimension of interpretation 
and mental processes. CC assumes Katz´s perspective on the functionality of 
emotions. Emotions are ‘self reflective actions and experiences’ (1999:7). We 
are ‘artful in producing emotions’ because they enable us to comprehend ‘the 
tacit, embodied foundations of ourselves’ (1999:7). Emotions constitute an effort 
to understand an existential problem: knowing the substance of the self (Katz, 
2000; 2002). Two dimensions in Katz´s conceptualization of emotions reinforce 
this functionality. First, emotions are ‘situation – responsive’ and ‘situation – 
transcendent’ narrative projects. Emotions are useful to individual interests and 
goals in understanding and dealing with particular situations. Second, emotions 
should be analyzed as an interaction process constructed by actors in relation 
 
6 An exception is Halsey and Young (2006) who criticize assimilating emotions with affections. 
However, they use only Massumi’s poststructuralist perspective on affections and do not argue why this 
is the best theoretical option. 
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to the interpretation and reaction of others. Individuals creatively use resources, 
notably their own bodies, to generate impressions of their emotions in other 
actors (Katz, 1999).  
The way cultural criminologists conceptualize and use emotions seems 
problematic for the explanation of crime for three main reasons.7 
 
1. Imprecise and intuitive conceptualization 
One problem is that Cultural criminologists have an imprecise, intuitive 
and operative use of specific emotions without any reference to a general 
definition.  For example, Young (2003) uses humiliation, anger, and resentment 
among others without discussing the nature of these emotions and how they 
particularly influence behaviour, as if the reader´s common sense were 
sufficient. When it is possible to find some vague and implicit definition or 
reference, the emotional dimension has been assimilated to: i) irrational states 
or a non-instrumental quality of actions (Hayward, 2007); ii) normative/moral 
components of behaviours (Hayward & Young, 2012); iii) identity or existential 
meanings (Presdee, 2000; Ferrell et al., 2004); iv) adrenaline thrill, excitement 
and preference for risk (Lyng, 1990; Ferrell et al., 2015); v) hedonism or 
pleasure (Presdee, 2000; Hayward, 2011); vi) search for control and capacity to 
choose (Lyng, 1990; Ferrell, 1996); and the capacity for abandoning a 
powerless condition (Presdee, 2000). When the term emotion embraces such 
diverse and heterogeneous entities, it runs the risk of losing its explanatory 
power.  
 
7 Failure to provide an adequate conceptualization of emotions is not an exclusive problem of cultural 
criminologists, and affects generally Criminology. However, it is CC that has emphasized the importance 
of using emotions to explain crime and deviance. 
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Additionally, most of these conceptual associations are problematic. 
Rationality involves an actor being able to achieve his goals in the most efficient 
way (Weber, 1951). Norms is one way in which rationality can be subverted. An 
individual might irrationally kill another individual following a moral norm 
although he perceives that he might suffer costs following his arrest.  Emotions 
are another way in which rational behaviour can be subverted. Particularly, 
emotions can be such a strong motivational force that might subvert both 
rationality and norms (Elster, 1996; 2009). A woman who suffers domestic 
violence might know that killing her husband involves multiple costs and even 
go against her moral principles, and yet, out of humiliation and anger she might 
end up committing this crime anyway. Whilst it may be argued that the 
imposition and efficacy of social norms is based on emotional background 
(Durkheim, 1964), ‘it is not indispensable for the operation of norms’ (Elster, 
1996:1389) and more importantly, it does not mean that norms and emotions 
are the same entity. Therefore, definitions (i) are problematic because they are 
based on a general characteristic (non-instrumentality) which is an insufficient 
condition for the presence of emotions and is also present in other concepts 
such as norms. Precisely, definitions (ii) confuse emotions with norms, and 
definitions (iii) are equivocal as while emotions might help to construct actor´s 
narratives and identities, they are analytically separable categories. In 
definitions (v) and (vi) there is a misunderstanding between emotions and 
outputs that may be obtained through emotions (e.g. control). Finally, definitions 
(iv) are questionable as they include elements that either are components of 
some specific emotions but are not emotions themselves (excitement, 
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viscerality, etc.), or they involve a different type of mental entity such as 
preferences.  
Defining emotions is a complex task. Surprisingly, cultural criminologists 
have paid little attention to specific literature on this topic. Although there is 
controversy in about which properties characterize emotions, and for every 
characteristic offered there is a counter example of an emotion lacking that 
characteristic (Ekman & Davidson, 1994; Frijda, 2000), a list of the most 
relevant properties of emotions can be set out.8 First, one of the most distinctive 
aspects of emotions is how they are felt. Every emotion is a unique and 
qualitatively different experience. Love involves a specific feeling which 
everybody can identify and not confuse with other feelings such as happiness or 
joy. Second, unlike other affective states, emotions have cognitive antecedents, 
which do not necessarily have to be truthful. Third, unlike feelings, emotions 
have an intentional object. They are generated by specific beliefs about 
something which can be facts or other agents´ actions or character. Fourth, 
emotions are usually accompanied by some physiological change or excitement 
(change in heart rate, blood pressure, etc.) traduced into external and visible 
signs such as the colour of the skin, body posture, etc. Fifth, emotions have a 
negative or positive valence, that is, they are pleasant or unpleasant. Anyone 
would include happiness among the first ones, and fear among the second 
ones. And finally, there is a strong and visible connection between some 
emotions and some tendencies to act. For example, running away when 
experiencing fear, or striking things/people when feeling anger. Of course, there 
is not consensus in the field of emotions and not all the experts agree with this 
 
8 This list is based on Frijda (1986; 2000) and Elster (2009); see also Ekman (1999) and Solomon & 
Stone (2003). 
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list. Some authors argue that some of these characteristics may not be 
necessary, and/or that additional characteristics should to be added (see for 
example Ekman, 1992).9 In any case, if emotion is to play a key role as 
explanans of crime, cultural criminologists need to elaborate a more precise 
conceptualization which takes advantage of these conceptual discussions 
beyond criminology.  
 
2. Emotion´s problematic functionality 
In spite of this conceptual vagueness, there is a shared idea of the 
functionality of emotions observed in the way in which emotions are used by 
cultural criminologists, and explicitly stated in Katz´s (1999) definition: emotions 
are not something uncontrollable which simply happens to agents. They are 
voluntary, expressive and aesthetic acts which help actors to gain identity, 
meaning and transcendence. This role is problematic in three senses.  
Firstly, it assumes an excessively active view of emotions which is 
disputed in the literature of emotions. Other authors have argued for the 
involuntary, visceral and impulsive character of emotions (Frijda, 1986; 
Lowenstein, 1996; Scheff, 2002).10 The idea that emotions are not chosen by 
individuals does not need to assume that emotions are automatic responses. 
Individuals can be trained to foster/inhibit emotions such as anger (Ainslie, 
2005). However, one thing is to learn how to deal with emotions by trying to 
 
9 Arguing for a more precise definition of emotions and its key characteristics does not involve ignoring 
the relevance of the social and historic context. The meaning of emotions, its social and cultural 
importance, and the specific nature of its connection with crime and deviance will vary significantly 
across time and culture.  
10 Katz acknowledges a non-intentional component. Although emotions are artfully produced by 
individuals, they also have the power to operate outside the ‘foreground of our self–awareness’ (Katz 
1999:2). However, the inclusion of non–intentional and bodily elements is unclear and the idea of 
emotions as corporeal self-reﬂective actions is incomprehensible (Wouters, 2002). CC ignores this 
tension except for an isolated and not very clarifying allusion to Katz´s (1999) third dimension of 
emotions labeled as ‘sensual metamorphosis’ (Ferrell et al., 2015:70). 
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modulate their extreme effects, and another thing is to be able to design 
emotions to produce ‘identity projects’. Additionally, the presence of positive 
effects of emotional behaviour does not necessarily mean that such behaviour 
was intentionally produced. If behaviour is recurrent and tends to produce 
positive effects, it might be explained in a non-intentional way through a 
reinforcement mechanism (Van Parijs, 1981). Even if emotional transgression 
produces effects in terms of identity/transcendence, it may be the unexpected 
result of behaviours oriented by different and more mundane goals. Once these 
effects are generated, it may stimulate further transgressions but without 
involving offender´s intentions as a causal mechanism.  
The second problematic issue is that CC´s intention-oriented version of 
emotion comes closer to ‘rational’ approaches. While psychologists have 
focussed on immediate emotions and other visceral factors that impact on 
behaviour, economists have studied anticipated emotions which are chosen or 
are expected to be experienced in the future (Lowenstein, 2002). Among the 
instrumental school, Solomon (1993) has argued that emotions are rational 
judgements or subjective strategies that seek to increase individual self esteem. 
Becker (1996) claims that individuals rationally choose emotions such as 
altruism and envy. In mainstream criminology, Katz´s sneaky thrills have being 
labelled as psychic returns to crime (Matsueda et al., 2006) and have been 
empirically evaluated in deterrence studies (Baker & Piquero, 2010; Nagin 
2013). Additionally, rational choice explanations of crime have included the 
expression of emotions as non-instrumental goal of offenders (Clarke & 
Cornish, 1985). Ironically, CC’s instrumental role of emotions is close to rational 
approaches and dismisses irrational components. 
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Thirdly, CC´s conceptualization of the function of emotions as meaningful 
and transcendent acts is empirically questionable. This approach ignores cases 
in which emotional reactions are isolated events detached from any voluntary 
identity project. Research has shown that emotionally motivated offenders 
resent being involved in crimes which are considered ‘desperate acts’, need to 
neutralize their crimes, and feel ashamed (de Haan & Jaco, 2003). Repulsion to 
crime, neutralization, and shame seem to be at odds with a transcendent life 
project. Owing to excessive emphasis on the significance of emotions, cultural 
criminologists assume as necessary a trait that is not always present in 
emotions, and therefore undermine its empirical validity.  
 
3. Analytical insensitivity to specific emotions 
Cultural criminologists show an imprecise use of specific emotions that, 
despite superficial similarities, are very different. An interesting example is 
Presdee (2004) that uses shame and guilt indistinctly in his writings. While both 
are negative emotions and produce physical pain, there are differences in the 
type of negative evaluation (global referring to the person as opposed to 
specific referring to the behaviour) and on the nature of the emotional reaction 
(public generated by others as opposed to private and self-inflicted) (Tagney et 
al., 2007). Shame and guilt connections with crime might diverge as 
Braithwaite´s (1989) theory shows. Although he uses other terms the idea is 
that emotions involving a more generalized negative evaluation of the individual 
tend to be more stigmatizing and therefore, more associated with crime and 
deviance. A similar superficial analysis can be observed in Hayward and 
Young´s (2004) use of emotions such as resentment, rage, anger, 
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vindictiveness and envy. They are all very different emotions which describe 
different internal states, are generated by different sources, and activate 
different behavioural tendencies. Using emotions to explain crime requires more 
than simply mentioning some negative emotions and stating loosely that they 
are a sensual and transcendent response to crime. Each emotion demands a 
specific analysis of its influence on criminal behaviour. 
 
4. Unexplored connections between emotions and crime  
CC´s analysis blurs two dimensions in the connection between emotions 
and crime. First, the idea that emotions might deter crime is ignored. Deterrence 
models include emotions as social/psychic costs and their effect on self-esteem. 
When individuals commit crimes they take into consideration these potential 
costs and try to avoid them (Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Paternoster, 2010; Nagin 
1998). Criminal justice measures might generate both emotional deterrence or 
emotional stimulation of crime. Second, emotional states can be associated with 
crime but as an antecedent motivational force involving diverse possibilities of 
analysis. On the one hand, emotions can act as a powerful motivational back up 
for fulfilling our goals. For example, actually responding to aggression might 
demand having a minimal emotional tone that energizes the individual to act. 
Katz´s (1988) righteous slaughter might perceive that some norm has been 
violated. Yet, without a minimal level of humiliation and rage, it would be 
impossible to end up killing his antagonist. On the other hand, the visceral 
character of emotions might act as a distorting force generating short circuits in 
individual´s rationality both when goals are conventional or criminal.11 An 
 
11 However, there is disagreement in the literature. While some authors defend this distorting role of 
emotions (e.g. Elster, 2009), other authors claim that emotions are a necessary condition for rationality:  
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amateur offender might fail to commit his first crimes due to paralyzing fear 
(Kessler, 2004). Instead, individuals might become unexpectedly involved in a 
fight and out of anger murder his opponent. Although there was no initial 
criminal goal, the transgression is the product of a strong emotional outburst 
constituted by anger (Luckenbill, 1977).  
More generally, to understand how emotions distort rationality and 
motivate behaviour, a precise understating of rationality is required. According 
to Elster, rationality involves optimizing in three senses: i) ‘choosing the action 
that best realizes the desires, given his beliefs about the consequences of 
choosing them’; ii) ‘beliefs are inferred from the available evidence by 
procedures that are most likely [...] to yield to true beliefs’; iii) gathering 
‘information in an amount that is optimal in light of the agent´s desires and the 
expected costs of gathering more information’ (Elster 2015:54). Emotions can 
affect rationality i) altering desires, ii) affecting directly beliefs by generating 
biased beliefs, iii) or indirectly, affecting the collection of information, generating 
low quality beliefs (Elster, 2009). Discussion of failures of rationality in 
criminology has generally focused on the cognitive dimension: problems of 
perception, sources of information, processing of information, etc. (Pogarsky & 
Piquero, 2003; Kleck et al., 2005; Matsueda et al., 2006), dismissing the 
distorting role of emotions.12 CC also has paid little attention to the emotions 
distorting role of rationality, except from some isolated references in Hayward 
(2007) to: Exum´s work on alcohol and anger; consumer research referring to 
short term emotions and its effect on consumers’ choices; and Hoch and 
 
emotions filter, select, and process information in order to evaluate more effectively available alternatives 
(e.g. Damasio, 1996; Slovic et al., 2002). 
12 Two exceptions are Bouffard et al (2002) and Exum´s (2002). 
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Lowenstein’s claim of integrating psychological and economical literatures on 
emotions (2007:237, 241). 
CC correctly censures the lack of emotions in criminological theorizing. 
However, it has not provided an adequate alternative solution. It relies 
excessively on an instrumental and transcendent perspective, fails to offer a 
more detailed account of specific emotions, and does not incorporate the 
deterrent and the motivational causal influence of emotions. There is a lack of 
dialogue with literature on emotions, notably in the psychological tradition. If 
emotions are to be incorporated in CC, a more interdisciplinary, plural and less 
restricted emotional approach needs to be assumed. 
 
V. Conclusions  
CC has correctly claimed that emotional components are relevant for 
explaining crime and deviance and have been underestimated in criminological 
theory. Although CC has not provided a satisfactory alternative, its internal 
contradictions are as not as serious as some critics have argued. Cultural 
criminologists and their critics assume questionable epistemological dualisms. 
On the one hand, the opposition between understanding and causal explanation 
is unnecessary. The idea of explanation as the search for causal antecedents is 
present in CC and can and should be explicitly assumed and developed, rather 
than rhetorically rejected. The key difference is the inclusion of cultural 
motivational states as causal antecedents in the explanation of crime. On the 
other hand, and against O´Brien (2005) argument, cultural explanations of crime 
can avoid abstract nomothetic models, by assuming a ‘social mechanism 
approach’ which emphasizes the contingent, specific and retrospective nature 
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of causal explanations and abandons predictive goals and universal explanatory 
claims. A second issue refers to several problems in one of the main 
components of CC’s explanation of crime: emotions. There is a tendency to rely 
on an intuitive and vague approach which not only incorrectly associates 
emotion with irrationality, norms, identity, etc., but it also too general and 
insensitive to differences among specific emotions. There is also a strong 
reliance on Katz´s (1999) idea of emotions as intentional, instrumental and 
outcome-oriented, which ends being too close to rational choice approaches. 
This restricted view of emotions underestimates its irrational and uncontrolled 
components, assumes a transcendent role and threatens its empirical 
evaluation. Finally, there is a dismissal of both emotions’ deterring effect over 
crime and its role as motivational antecedent.  
CC rejects a criminology based on a ‘dehumanized’ representation of 
crime which ignores the complexities of real experiences of offenders (Hayward 
& Young, 2004; Young, 2011). More generally, approaches emphasizing 
formalization, parsimony and prediction so removed from real world become a 
‘social science fiction’ (Elster, 2015:461). However, CC´s project of 
acknowledging greater levels of complexity through culture and emotions needs 
to: avoid rhetorical oppositions with vague antagonists such as mainstream 
criminology; not exaggerate its epistemological singularity and explicitly assume 
causal explanation; and improve and refine the conceptualization of its 
explanatory categories, in order to provide more reliable explanations. In fact, 
why not assuming a more open dialogue with quantitative criminology and 
perhaps enable the possibility of extending the empirical assessment of some 
CC’s hypotheses? Strongly based on qualitative methods and extremely 
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cautious with the application and interpretation of quantitative data is one thing; 
rejecting any possibility of using numbers is another (see for example, Garland, 
2012; Moran, 2014; Hough, 2014). Recent developments in CC and Cultural 
Realism have emphasized the need for a more causality – sensitive approach 
to social explanation and a more nuanced position regarding quantitative 
methodologies (Matthews, 2014a; Hayward, 2016). As Maruna claimed once: 
‘How might criminology be different if Jock Young’s work was also to become 
the basis for this level of sustained, empirical research? Can we imagine the 
armies of number crunchers at the American Society of Criminology even 
reading Vertigo, let alone using hierarchical linear models to understand the 
etiology of bulimia in society? If not, why not?’ (2008:538). 
 
VI. Bibliography  
Ainslie, G. (2005) Emotions as motivated behavior. Available at 
http://picoeconomics.org/Articles/HatfieldAI1051.pdf 
Baker, T. & Piquero, A.R. (2010) Assessing the perceived benefits-criminal 
offending relationship. Journal of Criminal Justice, 38(5), 981–987. 
Becker, G. (1996) Accounting for tastes: Cambridge, Mass, Harvard University 
Press. 
Boudon, R. (1998). Social Mechanisms without black boxes. In: Swedberg, R. 
and Hedström, P. (eds.) Social Mechanisms: An analytical approach to 
social theory: Cambridge University Press, pp. 172-203. 
Bouffard, J.A., Exum, M.L., & Paternoster, R. (2000). Whither the Beast? The 
Role of  Emotions in a Rational Choice Theory of Crime.  In: Simpson, S. 
(Ed.) Of Crime and Criminality: Using Theory in Everyday Life.  Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press, pp. 159 – 178.  
Braithwaite, J. (1989) Crime, Shame and Reintegration. Cambridge University 
Press. 
Brotherthon, D. (2014) Jock Young and the Criminological Imagination as a Life 
Force, Crime Media Culture, 10(3), 227 – 237. 
Carlen, P. (2008) Review of Jock Young´s Vertigo of Late Modernity, 
Theoretical Criminology 12(4): 528 – 531.  
Carlen, P. (2011) Against Evangelism in Academic Criminology: For Criminolgy 
as a Scientific Art. In: Bosworth, M. and Hoyle, C. (eds.) What is 
Criminology? Oxford University Press, pp. 95-110. 
Clarke, R. and Cornish, D. (1985) Modelling offenders´decisions: a framework 
for research and policy. Criminal and Justice 6: 147 – 185.  
32 
 
Coyle, M. (2009) Review of Ferrell, J., Hayward, K. and J. Young´s Cultural 
Criminology: an Invitation’. Crime Media Culture 5(2): 223 – 227. 
Currie, E. (2014) Criminology and Responsibility: Enduring themes in the work 
of Jock Young, Theoretical Criminology, 18(4), 413 – 421.   
Damasio, A. (1996) Descartes´ error: Emotion, reason and the human brain. 
London: Macmillian Press Ltd.  
Davidson, D. (1963) Actions, Reasons and Causes’. Reprinted in: Martin, M. & 
McIntyre, L. (eds.) (1994) Readings in the Philosophy of Social Sciences. 
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT, Press. 
De Haan, W. and Loader, I. (2002) Crime, Punishment and the Emotions. 
Theoretical Criminology 6(3): 243 – 253.  
De Haan, W. and Vos, J. (2003) A crying shame: The over – rationalized 
conception of man in the rational choice perspective. Theoretical 
Criminology 7(1): 29 – 54. 
Downes, D. (2005) Book Review: City Limits: Crime, Consumer Culture and the 
Urban Experience. Criminal Justice, Vol. 5(3): 319 – 327.  
Durkheim, E. (1964) The Division of Labour in Society. Free Press ed.: New 
York. 
Ekman, P. (1992) An argument for basic emotions. Cognition and Emotion 6, 
169 – 200. 
Ekman, P. (1999) Basic Emotions. In: Dalgleish, T. And Power, M. (eds.) 
Handbook of Cognition and Emotion. John Wiley & Sons. Ltd. 
Ekman, P. and Davidson, R. (1994) The Nature of Emotion. Oxford University 
Press.  
Elster, J. (1989) Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences. Cambridge University 
Press. 
Elster, J. (1996) Rationality and the Emotions. The Economic Journal, 106 
(438): 1386 – 1397. 
Elster, J. (1998) A Plea of mechanisms. In: Swedberg, R. and Hedström, P. 
(eds.) Social Mechanisms: An analytical approach to social theory: 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 45 – 73. 
Elster, J. (2009) Emotions. In: Hedström, P. & Bearman, P. (eds), The 
Handbook of Analytical Sociology. Oxford University Press, pp. 51 – 71. 
Elster, J. (2015) Explaining Social Behavior. More nuts and bolts for the Social 
Sciences. Cambridge University Press. 
Exum, M.L. (2002) The application and robustness of the rational choice 
perspective in the study of intoxicated and angry intentions to aggress. 
Criminology 40(4): 933 – 966. 
Farrell, G. (2010) Situational Crime Prevention and Its Discontents: Rational 
Choice and Harm Reduction versus. Cultural Criminology 44(1): 40 – 66. 
Felson, M. & Boba, R. (2010) Crime and Everyday Life. Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage. Fifth Edition. 
Fenwick, M. (2004) New directions in Cultural Criminology, Theoretical 
Criminology 8(3): 377–386. 
Fenwick, M., and Hayward, K. J. (2000) Youth crime, excitement and consumer 
culture: the reconstruction of aetiology in contemporary theoretical 
criminology. In: Pickford. J. (Ed.) Youth Justice: Theory and Practice. 
London: Cavendish. 
Ferrell, J. (1995) Urban Graffiti: Crime, Control, and Resistance. Youth Society 
27: 73 – 92. 
33 
 
Ferrell, J. (1996) Crimes of Style. Boston: Northeastern University Press. 
Ferrell, J. (1999) Cultural Criminology. Annual Review of Sociology 25: 395 – 
418. 
Ferrell, J. (2004) Boredom, crime and criminology. Theoretical Criminology 8(3): 
287–302. 
Ferrell, J. (2007) For a ruthless cultural criticism of everything  existing. Crime 
Media Culture 3(1): 91 – 100. 
Ferrell, J. (2009) Kill Method: A Provocation. Journal of Theoretical and 
Philosophical Criminology 1(1): 1 – 22.  
Ferrell, J. and Sanders, C. R. (1995). Towards a Cultural Criminology. In: 
Ferrell, J. and Sanders, C. R. (eds) Cultural Criminology. Boston: 
Northeastern University Press. 
Ferrell, J. & Hayward, K. (2014) Never Boring: Jock Young as Cultural 
Criminologist, Crime Media Culture, 10(3), 179 – 190. 
Ferrell, J., Hayward, K. and Young, J. (2015) Cultural Criminology: An Invitation. 
London: SAGE. Second Edition. 
Frijda, N. (1986) The Emotions. Cambridge University Press.  
Frijda, N. (2000) The Psychologist point of view. In: Lewis, M., Havliand - Jones, 
J.M. (eds.) Handbook of Emotions. The Gilford Press. 
Garland, D. (2012) Criminology, Culture, Critique. A review of Jock Young, The 
Criminological Imagination, British Journal of Criminology, 52, 417 – 425. 
Geertz, C. (1983) The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books.  
Giddens, A. (1984) The Constitution of Society. Outline of the Theory of 
Structuration. Cambridge University Press. 
Goertz, G. and Mahoney J. (2012) A Tale of Two Cultures. Qualitative and 
Quantitative Research in Social Sciences. Princeton University Press. 
Gottfredson, M. and Hirschi, T. (1990) A General Theory of Crime. Standford: 
Standford University Press. 
Grasmick, H.G. and Bursik, R.J. (1990) Conscience, significant others, and 
rational choice: Extending the deterrence model. Law and Society Review: 
24(3): 837 – 861. 
Hall, S. and Winlow, S. (2007) Cultural Criminology and primitive accumulation. 
Crime Media Culture 3(1): 82 – 90. 
Hallsworth, S. (2006) Review of Cultural Criminology Unleashed. Criminology 
and Criminal Justice 6 (1): 147-157. 
Halsey, M. and Young, A. (2006) Our desires are ungovernable: Writing graffiti 
in urban space. Theoretical Criminology 10(3): 275–306. 
Harris, M. (2001) Cultural Materialism: The Struggle for a Science of Culture, 
Altamira Press. 
Hayward, K.  (2002) The vilification and pleasures of youthful transgression. In: 
Muncie, J., Hughes, G., and McLaughlin, E. (eds.) Youth Justice: Critical 
Readings. London: Sage. 
Hayward, K. (2004) City Limits: Crime, Consumer Culture and the Urban 
Experience. London: GlassHouse. 
Hayward, K. (2007) Situational crime prevention and its discontents: rational 
choice theory versus the ‘culture of now. Social Policy & Administration 
(41)3: 232 – 250. 
Hayward, K. (2012) A response to Farrell. Social Policy & Administration 46 (1), 
21-34. 
34 
 
Hayward, K. (2016) Cultural Criminology: Script rewrites, Theoretical 
Criminology, 20(3), 297 – 321. 
Hayward, K. and Young, J. (2004) Cultural criminology: some notes on the 
script. Theoretical Criminology 8(3): 259 – 273. 
Hayward, K. and Young, J. (2012) Cultural Criminology. In: M. Maguire, R. 
Morgan and R. Reiner (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Criminology, 5th 
edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 113 – 137. 
Hedström, P. (2005) Dissecting the Social. On the principles of analytical 
sociology. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.  
Hedström, P. & Bearman, P. (2009) What is Analytical Sociology. An 
introductory Essay. In: Hedström, P. & Bearman, P. (eds.) The Handbook 
of Analytical Sociology (pag. 3 – 24). Oxford University Press. 
Hedström, P. & Udehn (2009) Analytical Sociology and Theories of Middle 
Range. In: Hedström, P. & Bearman, P. (eds.) The Handbook of Analytical 
Sociology (pag. 25 – 50). Oxford University Press. 
Hedström, P. and Swedberg, R. (1998) Social Mechanisms: An Introductory 
Essay. In: Hedström, P. and Swedberg, R. (eds.) Social Mechanisms: An 
Analytical Approach to Social Theory. Cambridge University Press, pp. 1 – 
31. 
Hedström, P. & Ylikoski, P. (2011) Analytical Sociology, in Ian Jarvie and Jesus 
Zamora-Bonilla (eds.) SAGE Handbook of Philosophy of Social Science, 
SAGE: 386-398. 
Hollis, M. (1994) The Philosophy of Social Science: An Introduction. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
Hough, M. (2014) Confessions of a Recovering ‘Administrative Criminologist’: 
Jock Young, quantitative research, and policy research, Crime Media 
Culture, 10(3), 215 – 226. 
Karstedt, S. (2011) Handle with Care: Emotions, Crime and Justice. In: 
Karstedt, S. Loader, I., and Strang, H. (eds.) Emotions, Crime and Justice. 
Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon. 
Katz, J. (1988) Seductions of crime. Moral and sensual attractions in doing evil. 
Basic Books.   
Katz, J. (1999) How emotions work. Chicago: The University Chicago Press.  
Katz, J. (2000) Review of Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions 
by Jon Elster. The American Journal of Sociology 106(1): 259 – 262. 
Katz, J. (2002) Response to commentators. Theoretical Criminology 6(3): 375 – 
380. 
Kessler, G. (2004) Sociología del delito amateur. Editorial Paidos. 
Kleck, G., Sever, B. Li, S. and Gertz, M. (2005) The Missing Link In General 
Deterrence Research. Criminology 43(3): 623 – 660.  
Little, D. (1991) Varieties of Social Explanation. Boulder Colo, Westview Press. 
Little, D. (2011) Causality in Social Sciences, in McKay, P., Russo, F. & 
Williamson, J. (eds.) Causality in Social Sciences (p. 273 – 295). Oxford 
University Press.  
Lowenstein, G. (1996) Out of Control: Visceral Influences on Behavior. 
Organizational Behavior and Human decision Processes 65(3): 272 – 
292. 
Lowenstein, G. (2002) Emotions in Economic Theory and Economic Behavior. 
The American Economic Review 90(2): 426 – 432. 
35 
 
Lowenstein, G. and Lerner, J. (2003) The role of affect in decision making. In: 
R.J. Davidson, K.R. Scherer and H.H. Goldsmith (eds.) The Handbook of 
Affective Sciences. Oxford University Press, pp. 619 – 642. 
Luckenbill, D.F. (1977) Criminal Homicide as a Situated Transaction. Social 
Problems 25(2): 176 – 186. 
Lyng, S. (1990) Edgework. American Journal of Sociology 95(4): 851 – 856.  
Machlup, F. (1961) Are the social sciences really inferior? Southern Economic 
Journal 17: 173 – 184, reprinted in: Martin, M. & McIntyre, L. (eds.) (1994) 
Readings in the Philosophy of Social Sciences. Cambridge, Mass: MIT, 
Press, pp. 5 – 19. 
Mahoney, J. (2001) Beyond Correlation Analysis: Recent Innovations in Theory 
and Method. Sociological Forum 16(3): 575 – 593. 
Maruna, S. (2008) Review of Jock Young´s Vertigo of Late Modernity. 
Theoretical Criminology 12(4): 534 – 539.  
Matsueda, R.L, Kreager, D. & Huizinga, D. (2006) Deterring Delinquents: A 
Rational Choice Model of Theft and Violence. American Sociological 
Review 71: 95 – 122. 
Matthews, R. (2014a) Realist Criminology. Palgrave Macmillan, UK. 
Matthews, R. (2014b) Cultural Realism? Crime Media Culture, 10(3), 203 – 
214. 
Matza, D. & Sykes, G. (1961) ‘Juvenile delinquency and subterranean values’, 
American Sociological Review 26: 712 – 19. 
Mclaughlin, E. (2008) Review of Jock Young´s Vertigo of Late Modernity. 
Theoretical Criminology 12(4): 531 – 534.  
Moran, K. (2014) Doing Quantitative Work Differently: Jock Young’s 
Criminological Imagination, Theoretical Criminology, 18(4), 459 – 468.  
Morrison, W. (1995) Theoretical Criminology: From Modernity to Post 
Modernism. London: Cavendish Publishing. 
Morrison, W. (2004) Lombroso and the birth of criminological positivism: 
Scientific mastery or cultural artifice? In: Ferrell J., Hayward, K., Morrison, 
W. and Presdee, M. (eds.) Cultural Criminology Unleashed. London: 
GlassHouse. 
Nagin, D. (1998) Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the Twenty-First 
Century. Crime and Justice: A Review of Research (23): 1-42. 
Nagin, D.S. (2013) Deterrence: A Review of the Evidence by a Criminologist for 
Economists. Annual Review of Economics, 5(1), 83–105. 
O’Brien, M. (2005) What is Cultural about Cultural Criminology?.British Journal 
of Criminology 45 (5): 599 – 612. 
Paternoster, R. (2010) How Much Do We Really Know About Criminal 
Deterrence? The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 100(3), 765–
824. 
Pogarsky, G. and Piquero, A. (2003) Can punishment encourage offending? 
Investigating the “Resetting Effect. Journal of Research In Crime And 
Delinquency 40(1): 95 – 120.  
Presdee, M. (2000) Cultural Criminology and the Carnival of Crime. London: 
Routledge. 
Presdee, M. (2004) Cultural criminology: The long and winding road. 
Theoretical Criminology 8(3): 275 – 285. 
Risjord, M. (2014) Philosophy of Social Sciences. Routledge.  
36 
 
Rocha, A.F.O. (2013) Crime e controle da criminalidade no Brasil: a 
criminologia cultural e suas contribuições para debate. Confluências. 
Revista interdisciplinar de sociologia e direito 15(2):121-136.  
Rosenberg, A. (2015) Philosophy of Social Sciences. Westview Press. Fifth 
Edition. 
Sampson, R. (2011) Neighborhood effects, causal mechanisms and the social 
structure of the city, in P. Demeulenaere (Ed.) Analytical Sociology and Social 
Mechanisms (pp. 227-250). Cambridge University Press 
Scheff, T. (2002) Review of Jack Katz, How Emotions Work. Theoretical 
Criminology 6(3):  361– 366. 
Schuilenburg, M., Staring, R., & van Swaaningen, R. (2018) Cultural 
Criminology Going Dutch. On Culture, Methodology and Research 
Agendas in Hayward, K. (ed.) Cultural Criminology, Volume III, Abingdon: 
Routledge, pp 252 – 272 
Sherman, L. (2003) Reason for Emotion: Reinventing Justice with Theories, 
Innovations, and Research – The American Society of Criminology 2002 
Presidential Address. Criminology 41(1): 1 – 38. 
Slovic, P., Finucane, M. L., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2002) The affect 
heuristic. In T.Gilovich, D.Grifﬁn,& D. Kahneman (eds.) Heuristics and 
Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment. Cambridge University 
Press, pp. 397 – 420.  
Solomon, R. (1993) The passions. Indianapolis, Hackett.  
Solomon, R. and Stone, L. (2003) On positive and negative emotions. Journal 
for the Theory of Social Behaviour 32(4): 417 – 435.  
Sorensen, A. (1998) Theoretical Mechanisms and the empirical study of social 
processes’. In: Hedström, P. and Swedberg, R. (eds.) Social Mechanisms: 
An Analytical Approach to Social Theory. Cambridge University Press, pp. 
238 – 266. 
Tanner – Smith, E. (2004) Review of K. Hayward´s City Limits: crime, consumer 
culture and the urban experience. Criminal Justice Review 32: 438 – 440. 
Taylor, C. (1967) Neutrality in Political Science. In Laslett, P. and Runciman, W. 
(eds.) Philosophy, Politics and Society, 3rd series, pp. 25 – 57.  
Tagney, J.P., J. Stuewig and D.J. Mashek (2007) Moral Emotions and Moral 
Behavior. Annual Review of Psychology 58: 345 – 372.  
Trajtenberg, N. (2011) Culture and Emotions in Cultural Criminology: An 
alternative Criminological Explanation, Mphil dissertation, Centre of 
Criminology, University of Oxford 
Van Parijs, P. (1981) Evolutionary Explanation in the Social Sciences. An 
emerging paradigm. Tavistock Publications.  
Von Wright, G. (1971) Explanation and Understanding. Cornell University 
Press. 
Ylikoski, P. (forthcoming) Social Mechanisms in Stuart Glennan and Phyllis Illari 
(eds.) The Routledge Handbook of Mechanisms and Mechanical 
Philosophy (pp. 401-412). Routledge. 
Young, J.  (2003) Merton with Energy, Katz with Structure: The Sociology of 
Vindictiveness and the Criminology of Transgression. Theoretical 
Criminology 7(3): 389 – 414. 
Young, J.  (2004) Voodoo Criminology and the Numbers Game. In: J. Ferrell, K. 
Hayward, W. Morrison and M. Presdee (eds.) Cultural Criminology 
Unleashed. London: Glasshouse Press, pp. 13 – 28. 
37 
 
Young, J. (2007) Vertigo of Late Modernity. London, Sage Publications.   
Young, J. (2011) The Criminological Imagination. Cambridge: Polity 
Weber, M. (1951) Economy and Society. University of California Press, Berkley 
and Los Angeles. 
Webber, C. (2007) Background, foreground, foresight: The third dimension of 
cultural criminology? Crime Media Culture: 3(2): 139 – 157. 
Wouters, C. (2002) Review of Katz ‘How Emotions Work’. Theoretical 
Criminology 6(3): 366 – 369. 
